By Robert Scheer
Truthdig: Sept 1, 2009
True, he doesn't seem a bit like Lyndon Johnson, but the way he's headed on
Afghanistan, Barack Obama is threatened with a quagmire that could bog down
his presidency. LBJ also had a progressive agenda in mind, beginning with
his war on poverty, but it was soon overwhelmed by the cost and divisiveness
engendered by a meaningless, and seemingly endless, war in Vietnam.
Meaningless is the right term for the Afghanistan war, too, because our
bloody attempt to conquer this foreign land has nothing to do with its
stated purpose of enhancing our national security. Just as the government of
Vietnam was never a puppet of Communist China or the Soviet Union, the
Taliban is not a surrogate for al-Qaida. Involved in both instances was an
American intrusion into a civil war whose passions and parameters we never
fully grasped and could not control militarily.
The Vietnamese Communists were not an extension of an inevitably hostile,
unified international communist enemy, as evidenced by the fact that
Communist Vietnam and Communist China are both our close trading partners
today. Nor should the Taliban be considered simply an extension of a
Mideast-based al-Qaida movement, whose operatives the U.S. recruited in the
first place to go to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets.
Those recruits included Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of
the 9/11 attack, and financier Osama bin Laden, who met in Afghanistan as
part of a force that Ronald Reagan glorified as "freedom fighters." As
blowback from that bizarre, mismanaged CIA intervention, the Taliban came to
power and formed a temporary alliance with the better-financed foreign Arab
fighters still on the scene.
There is no serious evidence that the Taliban instigated the 9/11 attacks or
even knew about them in advance. Taliban members were not agents of
al-Qaida; on the contrary, the only three governments that financed and
diplomatically recognized the Taliban-Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates
and Pakistan-all were targets of bin Laden's group.
To insist that the Taliban be vanquished militarily as a prerequisite for
thwarting al-Qaida is a denial of the international fluidity of that
terrorist movement. Al-Qaida, according to U.S. intelligence sources, has
operated effectively in countries as disparate as Somalia, Indonesia,
England and Pakistan, to name just a few. What is required to stymie such a
movement is effective police and intelligence work, as opposed to deploying
vast conventional military forces in the hope of finding, or creating, a
conventional war to win. This last wan hope is what the effort in
Afghanistan-in the last two months at its most costly point in terms of
American deaths-is all about: marshaling massive firepower to fight shadows.
The Taliban is a traditional guerrilla force that can easily elude
conventional armies. Once again the generals on the ground are insisting
that a desperate situation can be turned around if only more troops are
committed, as Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal did in a report leaked this week.
Even with U.S. forces being increased to 68,000 as part of an 110,000-strong
allied army, the general states, "The situation in Afghanistan is
serious. ." In the same sentence he goes on to say "but success is
achievable."
Fortunately, Defense Secretary Robert Gates is given to some somber doubts
on this point, arguing that the size of the U.S. force breeds its own
discontents: "I have expressed some concerns in the past about the size of
the American footprint, the size of the foreign military footprint in
Afghanistan," he said. "And, clearly, I want to address those issues. And we
will have to look at the availability of forces, we'll have to look at
costs."
I write the word fortunately because just such wisdom on the part of Robert
McNamara, another defense secretary, during the buildup to Vietnam would
have led him to oppose rather than abet what he ruefully admitted decades
after the fact was a disastrous waste of life and treasure: 59,000 Americans
dead, along with 3.4 million Indochinese, mostly innocent civilians. I was
reporting from Vietnam when that buildup began, and then as now there was an
optimism not supported by the facts on the ground. Then as now there were
references to elections and supporting local politicians to win the hearts
and minds of people we were bombing. Then as now the local leaders on our
side turned out to be hopelessly corrupt, a condition easily exploited by
those we term the enemy.
Those who favor an escalation of the Afghanistan war ought to own up to its
likely costs. If 110,000 troops have failed, will we need the half million
committed at one point to Vietnam, which had a far less intractable terrain?
And can you have that increase in forces without reinstituting the draft?
It is time for Democrats to remember that it was their party that brought
America its most disastrous overseas adventure and to act forthrightly to
pull their chosen president back from the abyss before it is too late.
Truthdig: Sept 1, 2009
True, he doesn't seem a bit like Lyndon Johnson, but the way he's headed on
Afghanistan, Barack Obama is threatened with a quagmire that could bog down
his presidency. LBJ also had a progressive agenda in mind, beginning with
his war on poverty, but it was soon overwhelmed by the cost and divisiveness
engendered by a meaningless, and seemingly endless, war in Vietnam.
Meaningless is the right term for the Afghanistan war, too, because our
bloody attempt to conquer this foreign land has nothing to do with its
stated purpose of enhancing our national security. Just as the government of
Vietnam was never a puppet of Communist China or the Soviet Union, the
Taliban is not a surrogate for al-Qaida. Involved in both instances was an
American intrusion into a civil war whose passions and parameters we never
fully grasped and could not control militarily.
The Vietnamese Communists were not an extension of an inevitably hostile,
unified international communist enemy, as evidenced by the fact that
Communist Vietnam and Communist China are both our close trading partners
today. Nor should the Taliban be considered simply an extension of a
Mideast-based al-Qaida movement, whose operatives the U.S. recruited in the
first place to go to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets.
Those recruits included Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of
the 9/11 attack, and financier Osama bin Laden, who met in Afghanistan as
part of a force that Ronald Reagan glorified as "freedom fighters." As
blowback from that bizarre, mismanaged CIA intervention, the Taliban came to
power and formed a temporary alliance with the better-financed foreign Arab
fighters still on the scene.
There is no serious evidence that the Taliban instigated the 9/11 attacks or
even knew about them in advance. Taliban members were not agents of
al-Qaida; on the contrary, the only three governments that financed and
diplomatically recognized the Taliban-Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates
and Pakistan-all were targets of bin Laden's group.
To insist that the Taliban be vanquished militarily as a prerequisite for
thwarting al-Qaida is a denial of the international fluidity of that
terrorist movement. Al-Qaida, according to U.S. intelligence sources, has
operated effectively in countries as disparate as Somalia, Indonesia,
England and Pakistan, to name just a few. What is required to stymie such a
movement is effective police and intelligence work, as opposed to deploying
vast conventional military forces in the hope of finding, or creating, a
conventional war to win. This last wan hope is what the effort in
Afghanistan-in the last two months at its most costly point in terms of
American deaths-is all about: marshaling massive firepower to fight shadows.
The Taliban is a traditional guerrilla force that can easily elude
conventional armies. Once again the generals on the ground are insisting
that a desperate situation can be turned around if only more troops are
committed, as Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal did in a report leaked this week.
Even with U.S. forces being increased to 68,000 as part of an 110,000-strong
allied army, the general states, "The situation in Afghanistan is
serious. ." In the same sentence he goes on to say "but success is
achievable."
Fortunately, Defense Secretary Robert Gates is given to some somber doubts
on this point, arguing that the size of the U.S. force breeds its own
discontents: "I have expressed some concerns in the past about the size of
the American footprint, the size of the foreign military footprint in
Afghanistan," he said. "And, clearly, I want to address those issues. And we
will have to look at the availability of forces, we'll have to look at
costs."
I write the word fortunately because just such wisdom on the part of Robert
McNamara, another defense secretary, during the buildup to Vietnam would
have led him to oppose rather than abet what he ruefully admitted decades
after the fact was a disastrous waste of life and treasure: 59,000 Americans
dead, along with 3.4 million Indochinese, mostly innocent civilians. I was
reporting from Vietnam when that buildup began, and then as now there was an
optimism not supported by the facts on the ground. Then as now there were
references to elections and supporting local politicians to win the hearts
and minds of people we were bombing. Then as now the local leaders on our
side turned out to be hopelessly corrupt, a condition easily exploited by
those we term the enemy.
Those who favor an escalation of the Afghanistan war ought to own up to its
likely costs. If 110,000 troops have failed, will we need the half million
committed at one point to Vietnam, which had a far less intractable terrain?
And can you have that increase in forces without reinstituting the draft?
It is time for Democrats to remember that it was their party that brought
America its most disastrous overseas adventure and to act forthrightly to
pull their chosen president back from the abyss before it is too late.
***
A Little Girl in Kabul
By Norman Solomon
Solomon's ZSpace: Sept. 1, 2009
Yesterday, I met a little girl named Guljumma. She's seven years old, and
she lives in Kabul at a place called Helmand Refugee Camp District 5.
Guljumma talked about what happened one morning last year when she was
sleeping at home in southern Afghanistan's Helmand Valley. At about 5 a.m.,
bombs exploded. Some people in her family died. She lost an arm.
With a soft matter-of-fact voice, Guljumma described those events. Her
father, Wakil Tawos Khan, sat next to her. He took out copies of official
forms that he has sent to the Afghan government.
Like the other parents who were gathered inside a crude tent in this squalid
camp, Khan hasn't gotten anywhere through official channels. He's struggling
to take care of his daughter. And he has additional duties because he's a
representative for 100 of the families in the camp, which is little more
than ditches, mud structures and ragged canvas.
Khan pointed to a plastic bag containing a few pounds of rice. It was his
responsibility to divide the rice for the 100 families.
Basics like food arrive at the camp only sporadically, Khan said. Donations
come from Afghan businessmen. The government of Afghanistan does very
little. The United Nations doesn't help. Neither does the U.S. government.
Khan emphasized his eagerness to work. We have the skills, he said -- give
us some land and just dig a well, and we'll do the rest. From the sound of
his voice, hope is fraying.
You could say that the last time Guljumma and her father had meaningful
contact with the U.S. government was when it bombed them.
If rhetoric were reality, this would be a war that's about upholding humane
values. But rhetoric is not reality.
The destructiveness of this war is reality for Guljumma and her father. And
for hundreds of families at Helmand Refugee Camp District 5. And, in fact,
for millions of Afghan people. The violence of this war -- military,
economic and social -- keeps destroying the future. Every day and night.
Is the U.S. government willing to really help Guljumma, who now lives each
day and night in the squalor of a refugee camp? Is the government willing to
spend the equivalent of the cost of a single warhead to assist her?
So far, the answer is obscenely clear. But maybe we can force a change by
contacting representatives and senators in Washington and demanding
action -- for Guljumma, for Wakil Tawos Khan, for all the other
long-suffering residents of Helmand Refugee Camp District 5 and for all the
victims of war in Afghanistan.
Success for one girl or one refugee camp might be a helpful baby step toward
reversing the priorities that now have the U.S. government spending about 90
percent of its budget for Afghanistan on military efforts.
Official Washington could start a move toward decency now. Helmand Refugee
Camp District 5 is easy to find. It's in the capital of Afghanistan, on
Charahe Qambar Road. A government that uses satellite guidance systems to
aim missiles should be able to find it.
___________________________________________
Norman Solomon is executive director of the Institute for Public Accuracy
and the author of many books including "War Made Easy: How Presidents and
Pundits Keep Spinning Us to Death." Readers who wish to assist residents of
refugee camps in Kabul can make a tax-deductible donation to PARSA, a
nongovernmental organization that provides vocational training and
employment placement for displaced Afghans. The contributions can be made
via the website www.afghanistan-parsa.org or by check to: PARSA, P.O. Box
31292, Seattle, WA 98103.
***
By Norman Solomon
Solomon's ZSpace: Sept. 1, 2009
Yesterday, I met a little girl named Guljumma. She's seven years old, and
she lives in Kabul at a place called Helmand Refugee Camp District 5.
Guljumma talked about what happened one morning last year when she was
sleeping at home in southern Afghanistan's Helmand Valley. At about 5 a.m.,
bombs exploded. Some people in her family died. She lost an arm.
With a soft matter-of-fact voice, Guljumma described those events. Her
father, Wakil Tawos Khan, sat next to her. He took out copies of official
forms that he has sent to the Afghan government.
Like the other parents who were gathered inside a crude tent in this squalid
camp, Khan hasn't gotten anywhere through official channels. He's struggling
to take care of his daughter. And he has additional duties because he's a
representative for 100 of the families in the camp, which is little more
than ditches, mud structures and ragged canvas.
Khan pointed to a plastic bag containing a few pounds of rice. It was his
responsibility to divide the rice for the 100 families.
Basics like food arrive at the camp only sporadically, Khan said. Donations
come from Afghan businessmen. The government of Afghanistan does very
little. The United Nations doesn't help. Neither does the U.S. government.
Khan emphasized his eagerness to work. We have the skills, he said -- give
us some land and just dig a well, and we'll do the rest. From the sound of
his voice, hope is fraying.
You could say that the last time Guljumma and her father had meaningful
contact with the U.S. government was when it bombed them.
If rhetoric were reality, this would be a war that's about upholding humane
values. But rhetoric is not reality.
The destructiveness of this war is reality for Guljumma and her father. And
for hundreds of families at Helmand Refugee Camp District 5. And, in fact,
for millions of Afghan people. The violence of this war -- military,
economic and social -- keeps destroying the future. Every day and night.
Is the U.S. government willing to really help Guljumma, who now lives each
day and night in the squalor of a refugee camp? Is the government willing to
spend the equivalent of the cost of a single warhead to assist her?
So far, the answer is obscenely clear. But maybe we can force a change by
contacting representatives and senators in Washington and demanding
action -- for Guljumma, for Wakil Tawos Khan, for all the other
long-suffering residents of Helmand Refugee Camp District 5 and for all the
victims of war in Afghanistan.
Success for one girl or one refugee camp might be a helpful baby step toward
reversing the priorities that now have the U.S. government spending about 90
percent of its budget for Afghanistan on military efforts.
Official Washington could start a move toward decency now. Helmand Refugee
Camp District 5 is easy to find. It's in the capital of Afghanistan, on
Charahe Qambar Road. A government that uses satellite guidance systems to
aim missiles should be able to find it.
___________________________________________
Norman Solomon is executive director of the Institute for Public Accuracy
and the author of many books including "War Made Easy: How Presidents and
Pundits Keep Spinning Us to Death." Readers who wish to assist residents of
refugee camps in Kabul can make a tax-deductible donation to PARSA, a
nongovernmental organization that provides vocational training and
employment placement for displaced Afghans. The contributions can be made
via the website www.afghanistan-parsa.org or by check to: PARSA, P.O. Box
31292, Seattle, WA 98103.
***
From: Inti Productions
We hope you can join us for a FREE concert at the Levitt Pavilion in MacArthur Park:
Wednesday, September 2, 2009 7:30 p.m.
2230 West 6th Street
Los Angeles, CA 90057
(213) 384-5701
Watch Huayucaltia in concert:
Bring your lawn chair or a blanket and a picnic. It will be a fun evening for all!
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