Thursday, November 5, 2009

Honduras: Solution or Stall?

This broader analysis presages and is buttressed by today's LA Times'
editorial, which begins:

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/opinionla/la-ed-honduras5-2009nov05,0,64597.story

"Waffling on Honduras

LA Times Editorial: November 5, 2009

A U.S.-brokered deal to return ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya to
office is unraveling, and the Obama administration seems to be wavering."

- - -

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091116/grandin

Honduras: Solution or Stall?

By Greg Grandin
The Nation: October 30, 2009

The Honduran crisis may soon be over. Maybe. The leader of the coup
government, Roberto Micheletti, agreed to a nine-point plan to end the
country's political impasse, brokered by Thomas Shannon, the former US
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs and Barack
Obama's yet-to-be-confirmed ambassador to Brazil. The deal would return
Manuel Zelaya, the democratically elected president deposed in a military
coup four months ago, to office; in exchange, the international community
will end Honduras's diplomatic isolation and recognize upcoming presidential
elections, scheduled for November 29.

Hardliners in the coup government, however, see a loophole in the accords,
which gives the Honduran National Congress the power to approve or reject
Zelaya's return. And no sooner was the ink dry on the accord than a top
Micheletti adviser, Marcia Facusse de Villeda, told Bloomberg News that
"Zelaya won't be restored." In a barefaced admission that the coup
government was trying to buy time, Facusse said that "just by signing this
agreement we already have the recognition of the international community for
the elections." Another Micheletti aide, Arturo Corrales, said that since
the congress is not in session, no vote on the agreement could be scheduled
until "after the elections."


But such a calculated reading of the agreement will not play well with most
countries, including the United Nations, the Organization of American States
and the European Union, which have repeatedly called for restoration of
Zelaya. Brazil--whose Tegucigalpa embassy has given Zelaya shelter since his
dramatic surprise return to Honduras over a month ago--applauded Shannon's
deal, yet made it clear Zelaya had to be reinstated. And in Honduras, the
National Party, whose candidate is expected to win next month's vote, wants
this crisis to be over. Its members in Congress may join with Liberal Party
deputies loyal to Zelaya to approve the deal.

The accord leaves unresolved the issue of whether the widespread human
rights violations that have taken place since the coup will be investigated
and prosecuted, only vaguely rejecting an amnesty for "political crimes" and
calling for the establishment of a truth commission. More than a dozen
Zelaya supporters have been executed over the last four months. Security
forces have illegally detained nearly 10,000 people; police and soldiers
have beaten protesters and gang-raped women. And the very idea of a
negotiated solution to the crisis grants legitimacy to those provoked it.

Still, if Zelaya were to be restored to the presidency, even just
symbolically, to preside over the November elections and supervise a
transfer of power to its winner, it would represent a significant victory
for progressive forces in the hemisphere. Here's why:

1. The attempt by Micheletti and his backers--both in and out of
Honduras--to justify the overthrow of Zelaya by claiming it was a
constitutional transfer of power will have definitively failed. If this
justification was allowed to go unchallenged, it would have set a dangerous
precedent for the rest of Latin America.

2. Efforts to rally support for the coup under the banner of anti-leftism,
or anti-Chavismo--much the way anti-communism served to unite conservatives
during the Cold War--will likewise have failed.

3. It will confirm the political influence--and unity--of Latin America's
progressive governments, particularly Brazil and Venezuela, which have taken
the lead in demanding that the coup not stand--a position that aligned them
with much of the rest of the world.

4. It will be an important pushback for Republicans like South Carolina
Senator Jim DeMint and Otto Reich, who tried to use the crisis to push for a
more hardline US policy against the left in Latin America. It is DeMint who
has put the hold on Shannon's confirmation, as well as on the confirmation
of Arturo Valenzuela, Obama's pick for Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs.

5. It will hopefully help the Obama administration realize that in many
Latin American countries, there is no alternative to working with the left.
In Honduras, the violence of the coup government, as well as the fact that
the extended crisis smoked out its less than savory supporters, like Reich,
awoke not too pleasant memories of the cold war. Reich recently penned an
essay urging Obama to replicate Ronald Reagan's successful Latin American
policy, which the Iran/Contra alum believed paved the way for the fall of
the Berlin Wall. Many, however, remember too well Reagan's patronage of
death squads and torturers. And reports that Honduran planters were
importing Colombian paramilitaries to protect their interests were not
helping defenders of the coup make their case. As protests continued, it
became clear to all who paid attention that it was the good guys--trade
unionists, peasants, Native Americans, environmentalists, feminists, gay and
lesbian activists and progressive priests--who were demanding the return of
Zelaya.

6. Zelaya's return would be a huge boost for those good guys, who are
largely responsible for the inability of the coup government to consolidate
its rule. Against all expectations, they have defied tear gas, batons,
bullets and curfews, and engaged in creative and heroic acts of resistance,
growing stronger and more unified than they were before the coup four months
ago. They will engage with the new government from a position of strength,
while the elites who have long ruled Honduras will be fractured and
chastised.

The accords brokered by Shannon force Zelaya to renounce any attempt to
convene a constitutional convention, yet the National Front Against the
Coup--the umbrella group that has coordinated opposition to Micheletti--has
made it clear that that demand is "non-negotiable" and that it would
continue to push for it, no matter who is president.

It was of course fear of a constituent assembly that provoked the coup in
the first place, and it is an irony probably not lost on those who executed
it that a large majority of Hondurans, according to a recent poll, now think
that such an assembly would be the best way to solve the country's political
crisis.

The last thing Micheletti and his supporters want to see is Mel Zelaya, with
his white cowboy hat and wide smile, addressing a large crowd filling the
streets of Tegucigalpa celebrating his reinstallation, building momentum for
fights to come. And this is why Shannon's deal is anything but done.

About Greg Grandin
Greg Grandin, a professor of history at New York University, is the author,
most recently, of Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford's Forgotten
Jungle City (Metropolitan). He serves on the editorial committee of the
North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA). more...

No comments:

Post a Comment