Switch to Petraeus Betrays Afghan Policy Crisis
by Gareth Porter
IPS: June 24, 2010
*WASHINGTON (IPS) - Despite President Barack Obama's denial that his
decision to fire Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal as commander in Afghanistan and
replace him with Gen. David Petraeus signified any differences with
McChrystal over war strategy, the decision obviously reflects a desire by
Obama to find a way out of a deepening policy crisis in Afghanistan.*
Although the ostensible reason was indiscreet comments by McChrystal and his
aides reported in Rolling Stone, the switch from McChrystal to Petraeus was
clearly the result of White House unhappiness with McChrystal's handling of
the war.
It had become evident in recent weeks that McChrystal's strategy is not
working as he had promised, and Congress and the U.S. political elite had
already become very uneasy about whether the war was on the wrong track.
In calling on Petraeus, the Obama administration appears to be taking a page
from the George W. Bush administration's late 2006 decision to rescue a war
in Iraq which was generally perceived in Washington as having become an
embarrassing failure. But both Obama and Petraeus are acutely aware of the
differences between the situation in Iraq at that moment and the situation
in Afghanistan today.
In taking command in Iraq in 2007, Petraeus was being called upon to
implement a dramatically new counterinsurgency strategy based on a major
"surge" in U.S. troops.
Obama will certainly be put under pressure by the Republican Party, led by
Sen. John McCain, to agree to eliminate the mid-2011 deadline for the
beginning of a U.S. withdrawal and perhaps even for yet another troop surge
in Afghanistan.
But accounts of Obama administration policymaking on the war last year make
it clear that Obama caved into military pressure in 2009 for the troop surge
of 2010 only as part of a compromise under which McChrystal and Petraeus
agreed to a surge of 18 months duration. It was clearly understood by both
civilian and military officials, moreover, that after the surge was
completed, the administration would enter into negotiations on a settlement
of the war.
Petraeus's political skills and ability to sell a strategy involving a
negotiated settlement offers Obama more flexibility than he has had with
McChrystal in command.
Contrary to the generally accepted view that Petraeus mounted a successful
counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, his main accomplishment was to make the
first formal accommodation with Sunni insurgents.
Petraeus demonstrated in his command in Iraq a willingness to adjust
strategic objectives in light of realities he could not control. He had it
made it clear to his staff at the outset that they would make one last
effort to show progress, but that he would tell Congress that it was time to
withdraw if he found that it was not working.
As commander in Iraq, Petraeus chose staff officers who were sceptics and
realists rather than true believers, according to accounts from members of
his staff in Iraq. When one aide proposed in a memorandum in the first weeks
of his command coming to terms with the Shia insurgents led by Moqtada al
Sadr, for example, Petraeus did not dismiss the idea.
That willingness to listen to viewpoints that may not support the existing
strategy stands in sharp contrast to McChrystal's command style in
Afghanistan. McChrystal has relied heavily on a small circle of friends,
mainly from his years as Special Operations Forces (SOF) commander, who have
been deeply suspicious of the views of anyone from outside that SOF circle,
according to sources who are familiar with the way his inner circle has
operated.
In an interview with IPS, one military source who knows McChrystal and his
staff described a "very tight" inner circle of about eight people which
"does everything together, including getting drunk".
"McChrystal surrounded himself with yes men," said another source who has
interacted with some of those in the inner circle. "When people have
challenged the conventional wisdom, he's had them booted out," the source
said.
The McChrystal inner circle has been accustomed to the insularity that
Special Operations Forces have traditionally had in carrying out their
operations, the source added.
The primary example of McChrystal's rejection of outside expertise that
challenged his beliefs cited by the sources is the case of David Kilcullen.
Kilcullen, a retired Australian Army officer, is recognised as one of the
most knowledgeable specialists on insurgency and was an adviser to Petraeus
in Iraq in 2007-2008. Kilcullen is known for speaking his mind, even if it
conflicts with existing policy.
After McChrystal took command of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan last
year, Kilcullen was slated to become an adviser on his staff. But after some
early interactions between Kilcullen, and the McChrystal team, that decision
was reversed, the sources said.
Kilcullen's views on targeted killings as wrongheaded clashed with the
assumptions of McChrystal and his inner circle.
McChrystal's staff was also supposed to create a "red team" of outside
specialists on Afghanistan who could provide different perspectives and
information, but after the inner circle around McChrystal tightened its
control over outside information, the idea was allowed to die, according to
one source.
Several members of McChrystal's inner circle are officers who worked for the
general during his five-year stint as head of the Joint Special Operations
Command, which carried out targeted raids aimed at killing or capturing
insurgent leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003 to 2008, the sources
say.
Two of the key officers on McChrystal's staff who were part of his former
JSOC inner circle are his intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Michael T. Flynn and
his Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville.
Flynn was McChrystal's director of intelligence at JSOC from 2004 to 2007
and then his director of intelligence at the Joint Staff in 2008-2008.
Mayville also served under McChrystal at JSOC.
McChrystal's political adviser, retired Army Col. Jacob McFerren, is not a
veteran of JSOC. But he is described by one source familiar with
McChrystal's team as one of the general's old Army "drinking buddies".
*Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specialising in
U.S. national security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book,
"Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam",
was published in 2006.
(FIN/2010)
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